

## Conflictuality in the G5 Sahel region: The Role of Economic Factors and Regional Resilience

*Fadoua Ammari<sup>1</sup> and Noura Benrezzouq<sup>2</sup>*

<sup>1</sup>Ph.D. student, Laboratory of Public Policy, Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences - Mohammedia, Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco

<sup>2</sup>Researcher Professor, Laboratory of Public Policy, Faculty of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences - Mohammedia, Hassan II University, Casablanca, Morocco

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**ABSTRACT:** The G5 Sahel, a region marked by its rich history and vast potential, confronts a myriad of socio-economic challenges and opportunities. This article delves into the intricate economic landscapes of the G5 nations, highlighting the pivotal role of resource-driven conflicts, with a focus on the significance of uranium in Niger's affairs. As the region grapples with external economic dynamics, the enduring economic influence of colonial powers, notably France, is evident. The burgeoning economic engagements of China in the Sahel further complicate the geopolitical canvas. However, the region's resilience shines through indigenous solutions, emphasizing the importance of traditional economic systems. Examples such as Mali's 'Tontines' and women-led cooperatives in Niger underscore the potential of grassroots initiatives in fostering stability. Furthermore, the prospects of regional economic collaboration among the G5 Sahel nations present a pathway to harnessing collective growth and reducing tensions. The article advocates for a balanced approach: leveraging external partnerships while prioritizing local solutions and regional collaborations, as the G5 Sahel charts its course towards a sustainable future.

**KEYWORDS:** G5 Sahel, Resource Conflicts, Neocolonialism, Indigenous Solutions, Regional Collaboration, Economic Resilience.

### 1 INTRODUCTION

African geopolitics, marked by a rich tapestry of historical, ethnic, and socio-cultural narratives, remains an arena of intense academic scrutiny. Over the past decades, the continent's sporadic eruptions of conflict have been variously attributed to political fragmentation, post-colonial state formation, ethnic cleavages, and more. Yet, while such factors undeniably shape Africa's conflictual landscape, the central argument of this paper posits that economic drivers, often overlooked in broader discourses, serve as fundamental catalysts for many of the continent's most protracted conflicts.

However, as the winds of globalization swept across the world and Africa integrated more closely with global markets and politics, a new dimension of understanding emerged. The economic underpinnings of conflict began receiving increasing attention. This paper asserts that, while the aforementioned factors are undeniably integral to understanding Africa's conflictual landscape, economic drivers have emerged as equally potent, if not central, catalysts for many of the continent's protracted conflicts.

The role of Africa in the global economic system, characterized by its vast natural resources, has historically been both a blessing and a curse. The allure of resources such as gold, diamonds, oil, and more recently, minerals like Coltan crucial for modern electronics, has often proven a double-edged sword. On one hand, they offer the promise of prosperity and development; on the other, they have often been magnets for both internal and external contestation, driving wedges in societies and drawing in external actors with vested interests.

This dichotomy is most starkly manifested in the G5 Sahel region. This belt, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is not just a geographic entity. It represents a cross-section of the continent where age-old pastoral and agricultural traditions meet the challenges and opportunities of the modern world. Here, vast mineral reserves lie juxtaposed with existential threats posed by climate change and desertification. Economic challenges, such as fluctuating commodity prices, foreign debt, and the constraints of global trade dynamics, further compound the region's vulnerabilities. These economic factors, while representing potential avenues for collaboration and shared growth, have at times been catalysts for conflict, creating fissures in an already fragile socio-political fabric. This raises a series of pressing questions:

How have historical economic relationships, particularly remnants of colonial ties, impacted the present state of the G5 Sahel? In what ways does the increasing footprint of global powers, like China, redefine the region's economic and political landscape? And amidst these external influences, can indigenous solutions and regional cooperation pave the way for sustainable peace and economic prosperity?

This paper seeks to unravel these intricate questions by delving into the nexus between economic drivers and conflict in the G5 Sahel region. Through a comprehensive examination of colonial legacies, the role of global powers, international financial dynamics, and indigenous economic strategies, we aim to present a holistic understanding of the challenges and opportunities lying ahead.

Recognizing the dynamic interplay of history and contemporary geopolitics, this research adopts a multidisciplinary approach, merging quantitative data with qualitative narratives to provide a nuanced understanding. While our focus is firmly on the G5 Sahel, we believe that the insights garnered here have broader applicability, potentially offering a lens through which to view other conflict-embroiled regions. It's imperative, especially for contemporary policymakers and stakeholders, to grasp the economic substrates of such conflicts, ensuring interventions are not just reactive but also preventative. Nevertheless, this paper has its limitations, primarily rooted in the vastness of the topic; therefore, while we aim for comprehensive insight, certain economic intricacies might only be touched upon cursorily.

## **2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC FACTORS IN SAHELIAN CONFLICTS**

### **2.1 COLONIAL LEGACIES AND ECONOMIC IMPRINTS**

The colonization of the African continent, which reached its peak in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has had profound and lasting effects on its economic frameworks. Renowned historians, such as Walter Rodney, argue that European powers – notably Britain, France, Portugal, and Belgium – created extractive economic systems that prioritized the needs of the colonizer over the colonized [1].

In fact, by the mid-20th century, African exports to European countries increased substantially, with raw materials constituting a significant percentage. For example, according to Rodney (1972), the value of African exports to Britain alone grew from £2 million in 1854 to over £20 million by 1900, illustrating the continent's increasing economic dependency.

Within the G5 Sahel, the French influence was especially dominant. Historically, Mali and Niger were not viewed through the lens of potential sovereign entities but rather as reservoirs of natural resources. In Niger, uranium mining became integral to its economy, with reports suggesting that by the 1980s, nearly 40% of France's uranium supply originated from this region. Meanwhile, in Mali, cotton became a significant export under French rule. By the time of Mali's independence in 1960, cotton constituted a major portion of its export revenues [2].

This emphasis on select resources meant that while some sectors flourished, overall economic diversification lagged. Post-independence, nations like Mali and Niger faced economic challenges as global commodity prices fluctuated, making them vulnerable to external shocks [3].

### **2.2 POST-INDEPENDENCE ECONOMIC CHOICES**

The trajectory of African economies post-independence is a tale of exploration, experimentation, and adaptation. According to *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics* (2015), post-independence Africa saw an intricate dance between global economic ideologies, primarily Western capitalism and Eastern socialism [4].

Post-colonial leaders found themselves at the nexus of important economic decisions. The African Development Bank (AfDB) notes that, from the 1960s to the 1980s, these choices revolved around state-led development models, with many countries opting for nationalization [5]. However, the 1990s and 2000s marked a shift, with an increasing emphasis on market-led strategies and private-sector engagement.

In the G5 Sahel, leaders grappled with these broader continental trends. For instance, Mali's socialist-oriented policies during the early post-independence years mirrored similar trends across the continent. Yet, by the turn of the century, as observed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its 2015 review, there was a noticeable pivot towards market-friendly reforms and increased engagement with international financial institutions [6]. Such transitions brought potential for growth but also challenges, especially in ensuring that economic gains were equitably distributed

### 2.3 THE INTERPLAY OF ECONOMIC AND SECURITY DYNAMICS

The nexus between economic factors and security dynamics in the G5 Sahel region is undeniably intricate. Economic hardships, stemming from factors like climate change, poor infrastructural development, and volatile commodity prices, often exacerbate security challenges by fueling local grievances and enabling recruitment by extremist groups.

A 2021 report by the International Crisis Group observed that jihadist groups in the Sahel often exploit economic vulnerabilities. For instance, these groups might provide essential services or security in areas neglected by the state, thereby gaining local support [7].

On the flip side, insecurity impedes economic development. Persistent attacks disrupt trade routes, deter foreign investments, and strain national budgets due to increased defense expenditures. According to the African Development Bank in 2020, the cost of violence and conflict in Africa, particularly in regions like the Sahel, reduces the continent's GDP growth rate by approximately 2% annually [8].

Regional initiatives, like the G5 Sahel Joint Force, aim to address the security challenges but require considerable financial backing. Such efforts are intertwined with economic development goals. For instance, a stable environment is a prerequisite for major infrastructural projects, attracting foreign investment, and ensuring that initiatives like the Great Green Wall reach their potential.

Addressing this interplay requires a comprehensive approach that combines military action with substantial socio-economic investments, ensuring that security gains are consolidated with tangible economic benefits for the local population.

### 2.4 CLIMATE CHANGE, ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION, AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS

The G5 Sahel region is one of the most vulnerable areas to climate change globally, experiencing temperature increases 1.5 times faster than the global average [9]. This, in turn, exacerbates existing challenges related to desertification, water scarcity, and food insecurity.

A 2019 report by the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) highlighted that over 80% of the Sahel's farmlands are degraded, affecting the livelihoods of almost 100 million residents [10]. This degradation directly impacts agriculture, a predominant economic activity in the region, leading to decreased yields and heightened food insecurity.

Such environmental challenges also drive economic migration. The World Bank estimated in 2018 that without decisive action, Sub-Saharan Africa, including the Sahel, could see more than 86 million internal climate migrants by 2050 [11].

To mitigate these impacts, countries in the Sahel have embarked on ambitious projects, such as the Great Green Wall initiative, which aims to restore 100 million hectares of land by 2030 [12]. Such endeavors not only serve environmental objectives but also aim to bolster economic opportunities, create jobs, and foster regional cooperation.

Yet, mobilizing adequate resources and maintaining transnational commitments for these initiatives remain persistent challenges, often requiring innovative financing mechanisms and consistent international support

## 3 ECONOMIC ROOTS OF CONFLICT

### 3.1 THE RESOURCE CURSE PARADOX: THE DICHOTOMY OF WEALTH AND WARFARE

The "Resource Curse", sometimes referred to as the "Paradox of Plenty", describes the perplexing situation where countries rich in mineral resources, instead of experiencing rapid growth, tend to have less economic development and worse developmental outcomes than countries with fewer natural resources [13]. The G5 Sahel, abundant in mineral wealth, is no stranger to this paradox.

There are several mechanisms through which the resource curse operates:

- **Economic Volatility:** Reliance on commodities exposes economies to price shocks in global markets. When prices are high, governments might overspend, and when they fall, economies often experience recessions, fiscal deficits, and unrest.
- **Dutch Disease:** An increase in revenues from natural resources can lead to a rise in a nation's currency value, making its other exports more expensive and, hence, less competitive. This can harm other sectors like agriculture and manufacturing [14].
- **Governance and Corruption:** High-value resources can incentivize corruption, mismanagement, and poor governance. The influx of wealth can reduce the state's incentive to develop effective institutions and instead foster patronage networks [15].
- **Sociopolitical Conflicts:** When immense wealth is at stake, it can be a magnet for conflict, as various factions and groups jockey for control over these lucrative resources.

To illuminate the complexities of the resource curse in the Sahel, we turn our attention to Mali, where gold's promise of prosperity collides with geopolitical instability.

Mali stands as a testament to the resource curse paradox. As the third-largest gold producer in Africa, Mali's vast gold reserves, particularly in the southern and western parts of the country, have not translated into widespread economic prosperity. Instead, the country has witnessed several coups [16].

While the gold sector contributes substantially to the state's revenue, it has also been a source of contention. Informal gold mining, involving local populations, often operates outside of state regulation, leading to environmental degradation, health hazards, and occasionally violent conflicts over mining sites. Furthermore, there's evidence suggesting that extremist groups, like al-Qaeda, have profited from the illicit gold trade, further destabilizing the region.

In such a landscape, the role of multinational corporations, state actors, and local communities becomes crucial. How these entities navigate the resource-rich yet volatile terrain of Mali holds lessons for understanding the broader resource curse paradox in the Sahel.

### 3.2 AGRARIAN AND LAND ISSUES: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGING ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC LANDSCAPES

The vast expanse of the Sahel is characterized by a delicate balance between agrarian and pastoral livelihoods. However, this balance is increasingly under threat due to a confluence of factors including climate change, population growth, and land degradation. Shrinking arable lands and erratic rainfall patterns exacerbate competition for resources, driving tensions between traditionally cooperative communities of farmers and herders. The scarcity of fertile lands and water sources often leads to encroachments into traditionally delineated territories, resulting in clashes that are sometimes escalated by other socio-economic and political factors [17].

Moreover, with increasing demographic pressures, the demand for land for agriculture has surged. This, coupled with limited alternative livelihood options, intensifies the struggle for resources. Mismanagement, lack of proper land tenure systems, and inadequate conflict resolution mechanisms further complicate the issue.

To further delve into the intricacies of agrarian challenges, we shift our focus to the recurrent farmer-herder conflicts across the Sahel—a tangible manifestation of the region's shifting environmental and economic terrains.

A reflection of this changing dynamic can be observed in the escalating conflicts between farmers and herders across the Sahel. The Farmer-Herder clashes, which have historically been managed through community-led mediation and shared resource agreements, have in recent years intensified in scale and violence. In places like Nigeria, Central Mali, and Chad, these confrontations have led to significant displacements and loss of life [18].

Rooted primarily in environmental pressures and resource scarcity, these conflicts are also exacerbated by underlying socio-political tensions, access to small arms, and sometimes manipulation by local elites. Addressing this challenge necessitates not only environmental and agricultural interventions but also robust peace-building and community engagement strategies.

### 3.3 ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND MARGINALIZATION: DISSECTING THE CYCLE OF POVERTY, RESENTMENT, AND VIOLENCE

Economic disparities, especially in the Sahel, are a significant contributor to feelings of disenfranchisement. A recent report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted that almost 40% of the Sahelian population lived below the international poverty line of \$1.90 a day as of 2019 [19]. Furthermore, according to the World Bank, despite marginal GDP growth in countries like Burkina Faso and Niger, income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has consistently remained high.

These economic disparities, concentrated particularly between urban elites and marginalized rural populations, engender resentment. The Brookings Institution, in a 2020 study, revealed that the Sahel, and particularly regions within Burkina Faso, displayed a widening chasm between urban development, as seen in capital cities, and rural stagnation [20]. Such inequality often translates into a sense of political and economic exclusion, which extremist groups readily exploit. A telling report by the International Crisis Group in 2021 underlined how extremist outfits capitalize on these socio-economic gaps, recruiting disillusioned youth by offering an alternative to their marginalized existence.

Shifting our analytical lens, Burkina Faso emerges as an illustrative case, epitomizing the confluence of internal economic disparities and external constraints. This examination provides a nuanced understanding, set against the backdrop of the overarching Sahelian dynamics.

Burkina Faso exemplifies how intertwined economic inequalities and external pressures can reshape a nation's stability. Even with considerable mineral resources, the benefits have not been universally felt. The capital, Ouagadougou, has seen a boom in infrastructure and development, while some rural regions remain underdeveloped. Additionally, data from the African Development Bank highlights that Burkina Faso's public debt as a percentage of its GDP increased by approximately 10% from 2015 to 2020, constricting its ability to address these internal challenges [21]. The encroachment of extremist groups into these marginalized areas makes matters even more complex, impeding developmental endeavors.

This intersection of internal and external pressures underscores Burkina Faso's role as a linchpin for stability (or instability) in the Sahel, underlining the pressing need to rectify economic inequalities for broader regional tranquility.

### 3.4 EXTERNAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS: FOREIGN DEBTS, TRADE, AND INTERNATIONAL INTERFERENCES

The Sahel's socio-economic landscape, though profoundly shaped by domestic choices and constraints, has also been subject to significant external influences. These externalities manifest in myriad ways, from debt-driven relationships with international financial institutions to intricate trade dynamics with global powers.

Foreign debt, for instance, has historically been a binding constraint on many Sahelian countries, limiting fiscal space and policy sovereignty. As per the International Monetary Fund (IMF) data from 2020, the average external debt for Sahelian countries hovered around 35% of their GDP [22]. Such debt burdens often necessitate stringent fiscal adjustments, which can have ramifications on public spending, including critical areas like health, education, and infrastructure.

Trade dynamics, too, play a pivotal role. The Sahel's trade relationships, especially with major global powers, not only determine the region's export-import balance but also influence local economic structures. For instance, the European Union's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with several Sahelian nations have had mixed outcomes, affecting domestic sectors like agriculture, which many Sahel populations heavily depend on [23].

The intertwining of international interferences is even more palpable when one delves into the realm of structural economic reforms. These interventions, often driven by multilateral agencies, have sought to recalibrate the economies of Sahel nations in line with neoliberal principles.

Delving deeper into the nuances of Sahelian economic dynamics, we turn our attention to Niger, a nation emblematic of the broader region's challenges. Specifically, we will examine the profound impact of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) on its economic fabric, illustrating the intersection of global economic policies and local realities.

Niger, a pivotal nation in the Sahel, has had its tryst with these externally-driven economic paradigms. Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), championed by the World Bank and the IMF in the late 20th century, aimed to instill market-friendly reforms in nations like Niger [24]. While these programs sought to boost economic growth by liberalizing markets, reducing government intervention, and enhancing export-led growth, their repercussions have been deeply contested. For Niger, a country with a heavy reliance on agricultural and mineral exports, SAPs influenced its economic fabric, at times exacerbating vulnerabilities to global commodity price fluctuations and causing social unrest due to abrupt changes in domestic policies [25].

While SAPs and their legacies have been a subject of rigorous debate, what remains clear is their lasting imprint on Niger's economic trajectory, encapsulating the intricate dance between local realities and external economic dictums.

## **4 ECONOMIC LANDSCAPES AND EXTERNAL DYNAMICS IN THE G5 SAHEL**

### **4.1 INTERWOVEN ECONOMIC PROFILES: DELVING INTO THE INTRICATE ECONOMIC NARRATIVES OF THE G5 NATIONS**

The G5 Sahel, comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, showcases a tapestry of unique yet interlinked economic narratives, each shaped by a combination of historical, geographical, and socio-political factors. While they share the commonality of grappling with the legacies of colonialism, each country's economic trajectory has diverged based on its natural resources, governance structures, and external influences.

For instance, while Chad has considerable oil reserves, which account for a significant portion of its revenue, Burkina Faso leans more towards agriculture, with a particular emphasis on cotton production. Mali and Niger, on the other hand, have rich deposits of gold and uranium, respectively, making mineral extraction a vital component of their economies. Mauritania, with its extensive coastline, derives substantial benefits from fisheries, but also has iron ore as a critical export.

Yet, despite these individual strengths, the G5 nations often find themselves ensnared in a web of economic challenges, stemming from factors like fluctuating global commodity prices, regional instability affecting trade routes, and a shared vulnerability to climate change which threatens traditional modes of subsistence. The Sahel's frequent droughts, for example, not only affect agricultural outputs but also exacerbate pastoral conflicts, impacting the wider economic stability of the region.

It is also essential to acknowledge the role of regional economic bodies like the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These organizations, while aiming to foster economic cooperation and integration, inadvertently highlight the disparities between the G5 Sahel nations and their more prosperous coastal neighbors, further complicating the region's economic narrative.

In understanding these intertwined profiles, one appreciates the complexities of crafting economic policies that cater to both individual national needs and collective regional aspirations.

### **4.2 RESOURCE-DRIVEN CONFLICTS: EXAMINING HOW RESOURCE ABUNDANCE AND SCARCITY MOLD CONFLICT SCENARIOS**

The Sahelian landscape presents a dichotomy where resource abundance and scarcity concurrently contribute to conflict. Historically, the "resource curse" has been evident in regions flush with natural resources, as these lead to economic imbalances and oftentimes spark political unrest [26]. Conversely, resource scarcities, such as dwindling water supplies, drive confrontations between competing groups, particularly as herders and farmers battle for diminishing fertile grounds [27].

The nature of resource-driven conflicts varies depending on the resource. For instance, an influx of foreign interest in mineral or oil reserves can alter regional power dynamics, leading to strife over control and resource allocation [28].

Niger's reliance on uranium not only drives its domestic economy but also positions it uniquely on the global stage. Let's explore the profound influence of this resource on Niger's national and international affairs.

Niger, as one of the globe's leading uranium producers, has a resource of pivotal geopolitical importance: uranium. The vast mines in regions such as Agadez and Arlit substantially contribute to Niger's export revenue [29]. However, this boon is accompanied by challenges.

Domestically, the revenue from uranium hasn't been uniformly distributed, leading to claims of marginalization, especially amidst the Tuareg population in the north. This disparity has historically incited rebellions and autonomy demands [30]. Additionally, the environmental repercussions of uranium mining, including concerns about water contamination, radiation, and land degradation, amplify tensions between communities, the state, and mining entities [31].

Internationally, Niger's uranium stock draws considerable attention, particularly from France, primarily through entities like Orano (formerly Areva). While this bond has brought economic advantages, it's also faced criticism for perceived neocolonial imbalances, with Niger often on the perceived shorter end of the bargaining stick.

As the global appetite for clean energy amplifies, underpinned by nuclear energy's potential, the significance of Niger's uranium - both for its internal dynamics and international partnerships - is poised to grow [32].

### **4.3 NEOCOLONIAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PLAYERS: SCRUTINIZING POST-COLONIAL ECONOMIC TIES AND THE EXPANDING ROLES OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS AND INFLUENCES**

In the post-colonial era, the vestiges of former colonial powers, especially France, remain perceptible in the Sahelian economic sphere. French companies are prominently involved in sectors ranging from energy to infrastructure in its former

colonies [33]. This sustained presence underscores a continuum of influence, sometimes labeled as "economic neocolonialism".

Furthermore, beyond economic dimensions, the establishment of foreign military bases has palpable economic and political ramifications. A study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2022 identified the significant socio-economic impacts associated with foreign military bases in the Sahel, particularly in Niger. Such installations, while aimed at counter-terrorism, also influence local economies, land prices, and employment opportunities, sometimes exacerbating existing tensions.

France's sustained economic involvement in its former Sahelian territories is a testament to its enduring influence in the region. Since the end of the colonial era, French multinational companies, financial institutions, and public enterprises have maintained significant stakes in sectors ranging from mining to telecommunications in the Sahel. Such entrenched economic engagements often prompt critical analyses. Critics argue that these investments and partnerships, while bringing certain benefits, can also perpetuate a neo-colonial dependency. This dynamic is characterized by Sahelian economies being heavily reliant on French capital, technology, and markets. Furthermore, concerns arise when the terms of these partnerships appear skewed in favor of French interests, potentially hindering local economic autonomy and capacity-building in the Sahel. As the global discourse on fair and equitable partnerships gains momentum, France's role in the Sahel remains under the lens, prompting both nations to re-evaluate and recalibrate their longstanding economic ties.

In Niger, the presence and operations of foreign military bases bring a nuanced dynamic to the local economic fabric. Beyond their overt role as bulwarks of defense and security, these installations intersect with regional economies, influencing aspects from employment opportunities to local trade. Local communities sometimes benefit from auxiliary services required by these bases, such as logistics, catering, and construction, leading to short-term economic boons. However, there are also concerns. The bases may heighten security threats, given their strategic importance, potentially affecting trade routes and the movement of people. Moreover, their presence can lead to social changes, including shifts in population as people move closer to bases in search of economic opportunities. Such demographic shifts can strain local resources and influence property markets. This intricate web of interactions underscores the profound ways in which foreign military installations can mold not only the security but also the socio-economic pulse of regions like Niger.

#### **4.4 CHINA'S SAHELIAN FORAY AND GLOBAL INTERESTS: DISSECTING THE REPERCUSSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENTS IN THE SAHEL**

Global powers have long had an interest in the African continent, with the G5 Sahel being no exception. Their motivations span from securing access to natural resources, fostering trade relations, to expanding geopolitical influence.

China, for example, has become a dominant economic partner for many African countries, including those in the Sahel. As of 2022, Chinese investments in Africa surpassed \$300 billion, focusing on infrastructure, energy, and mining sectors [34]. While these investments boost infrastructural development and create job opportunities, there's also concern about debt sustainability and the potential for economic dependencies.

The U.S., on the other hand, has pursued a more security-oriented approach in the Sahel, allocating over \$500 million in 2021 for counter-terrorism efforts, training, and capacity-building initiatives for regional forces [35]. However, it has also fostered economic ties through mechanisms like the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).

The European Union, given its proximity and historical ties, remains deeply involved in the region. The EU's Sahel Strategy, updated in 2021, emphasizes a balanced approach encompassing security, governance, resilience, and development [36].

While foreign investments and collaborations can provide critical capital, expertise, and market access, there's a need for Sahelian countries to negotiate terms that protect their long-term interests. Effective governance, transparency, and ensuring inclusive development are paramount in leveraging foreign involvement to the region's benefit.

Zooming in on Chad, we'll dissect how foreign-driven infrastructure projects influence both local dynamics and the wider Sahelian geopolitical fabric.

Chad stands as a prime example of China's burgeoning economic presence in the Sahel. A 2019 study by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) underscores the large-scale infrastructure projects undertaken in Chad, including roads, bridges, and an airport, primarily financed by Chinese enterprises [37]. While these projects promise enhanced connectivity and potential economic upliftment, there are concerns. Notably, the financial arrangements, often seen as "debt diplomacy," might place undue pressure on the Chadian economy. Furthermore, the geopolitics of the region might be reshaped as Chad becomes more interlinked with Chinese economic interests, potentially shifting its diplomatic postures and alliances.

## **5 SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESILIENCE AND INDIGENOUS SOLUTIONS**

In the complex landscape of Sahelian socio-economic challenges, there is an increasing realization that indigenous knowledge and practices might hold the key to building resilient and sustainable systems. Historically, the indigenous peoples of the Sahel have demonstrated a profound ability to adapt and thrive, with their practices fine-tuned to the unique environmental, social, and economic challenges of the region.

### **5.1 INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE AND ECONOMIC PRACTICES**

These traditional systems offer a wealth of knowledge that is grounded in centuries of lived experiences, fostering a sense of community, sustainability, and local empowerment. Moreover, indigenous economic practices often emphasize collective welfare and sustainable resource utilization, ensuring the intergenerational transmission of both tangible and intangible assets. A study by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) in 2018 highlighted the role of indigenous knowledge in sustainable land management, particularly in the context of climate change and economic adversities [38].

While modernization and globalization have ushered in a plethora of external economic practices and ideologies, it is crucial to recognize and integrate the value of these indigenous systems. They not only offer a complementary approach to modern economic paradigms but, in many contexts, present a viable alternative rooted in local realities.

In Mali, the traditional 'Tontines' offer a compelling lens through which to understand community cohesion and resilience. A quintessential example of this is the concept of 'Tontines', prevalent in Mali and other parts of West Africa. These are traditional rotating savings and credit associations, where members regularly contribute a fixed amount, and at each meeting, one member takes home the pot. While they are fundamentally economic structures, their impact transcends financial domains.

'Tontines' foster community trust, provide a safety net for vulnerable individuals, and facilitate local investment. According to a report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in 2020, such informal savings groups cater to sections of the population often overlooked by formal banking systems, especially women and rural inhabitants [39]. Moreover, the collaborative nature of 'Tontines' bolsters social cohesion, indirectly playing a role in community stability.

In essence, as Sahelian nations grapple with the multifaceted challenges of the 21st century, there is an inherent wisdom in turning to their roots. Indigenous practices like 'Tontines' embody the spirit of resilience, community, and sustainability – pillars upon which a stable and prosperous future can be built.

### **5.2 GRASSROOTS ECONOMIC INITIATIVES: HARNESSING LOCAL POTENTIALS FOR PEACE-BUILDING AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT**

Within the intricacies of the Sahel's socio-economic fabric, grassroots initiatives are emerging as potent catalysts for sustainable development and peace-building. By circumventing the complexities of larger, often bureaucratic systems, these localized approaches, rooted in the community's ethos, hold the promise of more direct and tangible impacts.

One such model that underscores this potential is the women's cooperative movements in Niger. Historically, women in Niger, and more broadly in the Sahel, have navigated a myriad of challenges, from socio-economic marginalization to the impacts of conflict and climate change. Yet, in the face of these adversities, they've initiated and led economic cooperatives that do more than just contribute to household incomes.

These cooperatives function as micro-ecosystems of economic empowerment and social cohesion. By offering women an avenue for financial independence, they invariably bolster their socio-political agency, enabling them to participate more assertively in community dialogues and decision-making processes. Furthermore, these cooperatives serve as spaces for social interaction and collaboration, fostering a sense of communal unity and facilitating conflict resolution at local levels.

In Niger, such movements are not just reshaping the economic landscape but also influencing peace-building endeavors. The interconnectedness of economic stability and peace is palpable, especially in conflict-prone regions. When communities are economically empowered and self-reliant, they are better positioned to mediate conflicts, resist external divisive forces, and invest in their collective future [40].

However, for these grassroots initiatives to scale and sustain, there's a pressing need for supportive policies, capacity-building programs, and an acknowledgment of their role by national and international stakeholders.

### 5.3 REGIONAL ECONOMIC COLLABORATION: AN IMPERATIVE FOR COLLECTIVE GROWTH AND STABILITY IN THE G5 SAHEL

The intricate tapestry of the Sahel, marked by shared histories, cultural continuities, and overlapping challenges, provides a compelling rationale for enhanced regional economic collaboration among the G5 Sahel members. Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, each with their distinct economic strengths and challenges, present a combined potential that, if harnessed synergistically, could pave the way for a prosperous and stable Sahel.

Economic collaboration at the regional level offers multiple advantages. Primarily, it allows for the optimization of resources and expertise, enabling member states to achieve economies of scale. For instance, while Mali has vast agricultural potential, particularly in the domain of cotton production, Niger boasts significant uranium reserves. A collaborative framework could ensure that Mali's agricultural products find markets in Niger, while Niger's mineral resources cater to the energy needs of its neighbors.

One of the salient aspects of such collaboration lies in the realm of cross-border trade. The G5 Sahel nations, with their shared borders and socio-cultural ties, have long-standing informal trade networks. Formalizing and enhancing these trade channels can be instrumental in not only boosting economic activity but also in alleviating some of the region's pressing challenges. For instance, reducing barriers to trade and simplifying customs procedures can lead to increased trade volumes, thereby generating employment, increasing government revenues, and fostering economic resilience [41].

Furthermore, the potential of cross-border trade in reducing tensions cannot be understated. Enhanced economic interdependence cultivates a stake in each other's stability, making conflict less appealing and collaboration more advantageous. Vibrant border markets can become zones of shared prosperity, drawing people from different nations into daily commerce and interaction, thereby fostering mutual understanding and trust.

However, to realize this vision of collaborative growth, there's a need for robust policy frameworks, investment in shared infrastructures such as roads and border market facilities, and mechanisms to resolve trade disputes amicably.

In essence, regional economic collaboration among the G5 Sahel members isn't just an economic imperative; it's a strategic necessity to ensure the long-term stability and prosperity of the Sahel.

## 6 CONCLUSION

The G5 Sahel region, encompassing Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, stands at a crossroads characterized by intricate challenges. These states grapple with the reverberating effects of climate change, which exacerbates socioeconomic vulnerabilities, intensifying resource scarcities, and heightening food insecurities. Such environmental and economic stressors precipitate significant demographic displacements, often culminating in contentious conflicts over territorial rights, vital resources, and political inclusion.

Yet, within this mosaic of challenges lies the Sahel's latent potential, underpinned by its rich cultural heritage, historical profundity, and untapped resources. To harness this potential, there is an exigent need for a holistic, multi-dimensional strategy that synergizes prevention, adaptation, and sustainable development.

The international community, in this respect, has a pivotal role to play. While the primary onus of navigating these challenges lies with the local governments and communities, given their nuanced understanding of regional complexities, international actors can offer indispensable resources, expertise, and diplomatic leverage. Collaborative international efforts can thus catalyze and complement indigenous solutions.

In light of the above, this analysis underscores the imperative for the global community to recommit to, and augment, its engagement with the G5 Sahel region. A paradigm shift from crisis response to long-term sustainable solutions is not just advisable, but imperative. The narrative of the Sahel need not be perennially mired in conflict; with sustained international partnership, the region can transition towards enduring stability and prosperity. It remains an ethical and strategic imperative for global stakeholders to bolster the endeavors aimed at orchestrating this transformation.

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